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ABSTRACT 
Persistent ethnic conflict in Darfur has been met by third-party interventions with 
varying degrees of success. This paper seeks to isolate different methods of intervention 
in order to understand what types are effective in reducing the number of people affected 
by violence caused by ethnic conflict. Each intervention is separated into three categories 
based on their nature: humanitarian, militaristic, and diplomatic. These actions are then 
juxtaposed with data from medical journals that describe the effects of violence, 
including death by violence, death by disease, and child mortality rates. The success of an 
intervention is measured by its ability to reduce the number of people negatively affected 
by the violence. This analysis suggests that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect 
on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while humanitarian and diplomatic interventions 
produce ambiguous results. The results are significant in their ability to shed light on 
effective methods by which to alleviate one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st 
century.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Sudan has been plagued by conflict since 1955, predating their independence 
from British-Egyptian forces (Jesse and Williams 2010, 191). Since then, various conflict 
fueled by ethnic tensions have broken out in the country. Conflict between northern 
Sudan, populated by predominantly Arab Muslims, and southern Sudan, predominantly 
black Christians, started with the first civil war in 1955. In 2011, South Sudan 
orchestrated a successful referendum on independence, which marked the beginning of an 
internal conflict between Dinkas and Nuers, both tribes native to the region. Finally, in 
the western Darfur Province, ethnic cleansing against the province’s non-Arab population 
has resulted in 2.66 million displaced people as of December 2015 (Reeves 2016).  
 Throughout this prolonged conflict, there has been a pattern of international 
actions, although each implemented with varying degrees of success. From Ethiopia’s 
role in hosting the Addis Ababa talks in 1972, to Chad’s role in spreading weapons across 
boarders (CITE), to the United Nations’ role in dispatching Peacekeeping Missions 
(CITE), a number of international actors have had an impact on the ethnic conflict in 
Sudan (Jesse and Williams 2010, 192; The Devil Came on Horseback). However, little 
literature exists analyzing the effects of these third party actors in Sudan as a whole, and 
even fewer scholarly pieces focus on Darfur specifically. This research seeks to answer 
the following question: what forms of third-party intervention have been helpful in 
managing ethnic conflict in Darfur?   
 I proposed that humanitarian intervention would be the most effective form of 
third-party action, and that military and diplomatic aid would have mixed results. 
Humanitarian intervention, I argued, would lower the death toll as medical and nutritional 
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aid was distributed throughout the conflict zone. Military intervention would only 
exacerbate violence with an influx of weapons while diplomatic intervention would be 
largely symbolic and its efforts would ultimately fall flat. I use quantitative data on the 
total number of the affected population, which includes mortality rates for not just 
violence related deaths, but also excess deaths, allowing for a fuller understanding of how 
conflict may indirectly cause death. I then compared those numbers to qualitative data 
from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project and Al-Jazeera to find correlations between 
actions taken by third parties and the rise and fall of the death toll. I split the forms of 
intervention into three categories: humanitarian, diplomatic, and militaristic. I find that 
diplomatic interventions have been the only consistently positive form of third-party 
action in Darfur, while humanitarian and military intervention produce mixed results.  
 This research is important in finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. 
Many countries, such as Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, and the United States have become 
involved in the conflict with varying degrees of success (Jesse and Williams 2010, 191-
192). The findings are important in helping third parties interested in the outcome in 
Darfur focus their efforts into the most effective interventions possible. The results may 
serve to alter the foreign policies of currently involved countries in order to most 
effectively manage conflict. Given the success of diplomatic efforts in Darfur, 
governments may be able to reduce the costs of humanitarian aid sent to Darfur and the 
human cost of sending troops to the region in order to reallocate their efforts to the 
diplomatic arena. It is necessary to understand what forms of intervention are effective in 
order to best alleviate the suffering of the millions of Darfurians affected by the ethnic 
violence.  
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THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT 
The main difference in literature surrounding ethnic conflict in Darfur varies in 
the chosen unit of analysis. One school of thought is represented by Elke Grawert, who 
proposes that in order to analyze ethnic conflict in Sudan, it is necessary to use sub-
regional units as the unit of analysis (2008). Grawert argues that historically, conflicts in 
Africa are presented as ethnic grievance-driven violence within weak states. However, 
ethnic conflicts on the continent would be better understood if they were viewed not as 
local conflict, but rather as violence interlinked with the goals of government groups and 
militias in the larger sub-region (Grawert 2008). In the case of Sudan, it is critical to 
understand the relationship between Darfur and other sub-regional actors. In 1991, the 
regime change in Ethiopia caused the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) to lose its support in the country, which caused a “severe internal split” within 
the organization. This split weakened the SPLM/A, forcing it to change its war strategy to 
focus on “marginalized regions of east and west Sudan.” (Grawert 2008, 606) The SPLA 
created the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), which drew support from allies and bases in 
Chad (Grawert 2008, 607). Moreover, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had 
close links to Chad and continue to demand “inclusion in power-sharing agreements or 
else the separation of Darfur from Sudan.” (Grawert 2008, 607) The violence in Darfur 
has also caused mass displacement, which has in turn caused Darfurian refugees to cross 
the border into Chad (HRW 2007). It is therefore critical to understand the sub-regional 
actors in Darfur to truly analyze the effectiveness of military and diplomatic interventions 
in the province.  
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  Harvey Glickman similarly studies the effect neighboring states may have on 
political unrest (2000). Sudan lies “on the southern fringe of Muslim cultural hegemony” 
and Muslims within the country have attempted to force non-Muslims within their own 
population to convert. The government has supported a number of Islamization efforts 
through “military regimes, civil war, and now electoral authoritarianism.” (Glickman 
2000) Non-Arab ethnic groups, including the Fur (a predominant ethnic group in Darfur), 
have been subject to “intense Arabization,” fueling ethnic conflict (Glickman 2000). 
Hassan al-Turabi, one of the key figures in institutionalizing Islamic law in Sudan, gained 
the support of the Muslim World League, an organization that views Sudan as “a 
springboard for Islamist penetration of black Africa.” This indicates the important of 
third-party actors in the Arab world in managing ethnic conflict in Sudan as a whole, and 
more importantly as the religious foundation for the Janjaweed, an Arab ethnic nationalist 
group accused of perpetrating ethnic cleansing in Darfur (Jesse and Williams 2010, 198).  
Other scholars focus less on sub-regional and other countries as third-party actors 
and instead focus on the United Nations and international community as a whole. Spencer 
Zifcak argues that crimes against humanity have clearly been committed by actors in 
Sudan and while the United Nations Security Council expressed “grave concern,” took 
preventative actions that were “too little and too late” to abate the suffering that would 
soon follow (2015). Peacekeeping missions and resolutions were important symbolic 
steps towards finding peace, but ultimately did little in the goal of ending violence 
(Zifcak 2015). Kelly Diep agrees, claiming that the lack of implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine has directly, adversely affected Darfurian 
citizens. She goes further to compare the situation in Darfur to the genocide in Rwanda: 
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 “… [T]he slow and diffident response of international actors to the 
Darfur crisis is reminiscent of the delayed, international reaction to the 
Rwandan genocide. Both genocides appear to suggest that while such 
conflicts are rooted in a nation’s historical ethnic conflicts, their horrific 
consequences are inevitably tied to protracted and superficial responses 
of the international community.” (Diep 2007, 6) 
 
International actors have witnessed the ethnically fueled crimes committed by he 
Janjaweed and, like Rwanda, the international community has hesitated to call the 
situation a “genocide,” a word that necessitates certain actions (Diep 2007, 6). The 
actions, or the lack thereof, the international community has taken in terms of military, 
diplomatic, and humanitarian intervention in Darfur are therefore critical in 
understanding how ethnic conflict has been managed.  
 In general literature, there are a number of ideas surrounding international 
intervention into ethnic conflicts. Matthew Krain represents the hardline belief that only 
direct a military challenge to the perpetrators of genocide can effectively stem the 
violence (2005). He further proposes that impartial interventions are “ineffective at 
reducing severity” of genocide and that a military intervention does not worsen the 
situation of the targets of genocide (Krain 2005, 363). In Darfur, this would most likely 
manifest as an intervention of another country into the region in order to protect the non-
Arab populations from the Janjaweed. However, Findley and Teo warn that an 
intervention like this should be analyzed from an “actor-centric” approach in order to 
understand the motivation behind direct action (2006, 282). They find that states are more 
likely to intervene in ethnic or ideological conflicts, which makes the case of Darfur a 
divergent case study (Findley and Teo 2006, 836).  
 On the other hand, some scholars believe that external interventions lengthen the 
duration of civil wars. Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis claim that because 
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external military and financial interventions tend to reduce the cost of fighting a 
rebellion, civil wars become longer (2000, 16). In Sudan, military supply is provided by 
countries such as China, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom, and Brazil, all of which may have played a role in elongating this conflict 
(Jesse and Williams 2010, 215). Lake and Rothchild have similar doubts about third-
party interventions, arguing that their effectiveness is limited but that in the long term, 
there is no “practical alternative” (1996, 42). They propose that conflict is caused by 
ethnic fears of the future, so third parties desiring to preempt ethnic conflict effectively 
must intervene to quell those fears. After ethnic conflict has broken out, the most 
effective external intervention becomes supporting local leaders’ effort to build 
confidence in the group’s future security (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 56). The authors 
suggest that political and administrative decentralization could be effective in addressing 
ethnic conflict in Sudan as elites in regional authorities promote confidence in local 
leaders (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 61).  
Literature regarding the role of third-party interventions in Darfur address 
individual nations’, religion’s, and the international community’s actions in the region. 
However, there is a gap in the literature in comparing what forms of intervention these 
actors take to explain what the most effective forms are in managing the ethnic conflict. 
By pulling from the general scholarship on third-party interventions, this research seeks 
to test theories regarding effective third-party interventions in the context of Darfur. 
Additionally, scholarship specific to Sudan and Darfur will serve as benchmarks for 
analyzing the effectiveness of different third-party responses in the region.  
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND HUMANITARIAN AID 
 
 While the conflict in Darfur has varied in its strength, so too have third-party 
interventions. Third-party interventions within the scope of this research will be defined 
as any military, diplomatic, or humanitarian aid given from any actor outside of Sudan to 
any party involved in the ethnic conflict in Darfur. By isolating the actions of third parties 
and defining them within categories, it may be possible to glean insight into the variances 
in severity of conflict within the region. Successful third-party interventions will reduce 
the number of people affected by the violence while unsuccessful interventions will 
increase the number of affected people. The independent variable of this research will 
then be third-party interventions while the dependent variable will be ethnic conflict.  
 External actors have the potential to alleviate conflict-riddled regions, but 
simultaneously run the risk of exacerbating conflict. Interventions such as peacekeeping 
missions and humanitarian aid deliverance are less likely to exacerbate conflict, but may 
prolong it. Direct military intervention may be more effective in the short-term, but have 
an adverse effect on citizens in the area. Diplomatic intervention may take important 
symbolic steps to address the conflict, but without any weight, may fall short of their 
goals. Any form of intervention has some effect on ethnic conflict; this research seeks to 
begin a dialogue about what forms of intervention are the most effective in managing 
ethnic conflict. I propose that humanitarian intervention will be the most effective form 
of third-party intervention, while military and diplomatic interventions will have either 
neutral or negative results.  
 I propose that the strength of humanitarian aid will be negative correlated with 
death rates. Providing humanitarian aid means prevents high numbers of excess deaths as 
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citizens receive better medical and nutritional health than they would without it. 
Additionally, the presence of material aid makes it more difficult for extreme, violent 
groups to recruit, as the population is generally better off. Humanitarian aid also indicates 
that bodies in the international community are paying attention to the conflict, which may 
be tied to diplomatic efforts in the region.  
 Unlike Krain, I propose that military interventions will have neutral or negative 
effects when it comes to death tolls in Darfur (2005). While he argues that impartial 
interventions are ineffective in reducing the severity of genocide, I counter that military 
intervention increases the amount of violence and casualties in an area. When 
international actors observe a conflict that seems unbalanced, they may be incentive to 
become involved in order to even the playing field. Additionally, military intervention 
exacerbates the existing security dilemma in the region. If one side bulks up their military 
capabilities, as occurs when third parties intervene, the opposing groups will scramble to 
increase their own capabilities in order to compete. This will either cause a stagnant 
number of deaths as each side is afraid to escalate violence or cause an increase in the 
number of deaths. Unless the third-party military intervention is so strong on one side 
that if overpowers the other (which no third party has proved willing to do in the case of 
Darfur), this form of intervention will not decrease the number of deaths.  
 Finally, third-party diplomatic interventions will similarly have a neutral or 
positive correlation with the death toll in Darfur. Diplomatic efforts have already proven 
to fail in the region, as seen with the UNSC and application of R2P (Diep 2007, Zifcak 
2015). In an actor-centric approach, it may be seen that third parties have selfish goals in 
mind when intervening, which may elongate the conflict (Findley and Teo 2006).  
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HYPOTHESIS  
 I hypothesize that humanitarian aid will be the only effective form of third-party 
intervention in managing ethnic conflict in the case of Darfur. In terms of humanitarian 
intervention, Darfurian citizens are less likely to die from malnutrition and disease than 
they are without that aid. Humanitarian organizations are also more likely to receive 
international support, which will lead them to distribute aid evenly across affected ethnic 
groups, as opposed to a specific one. Furthermore, having access to humanitarian aid 
often decreases the chance of radicalization than in circumstances of abject poverty. If 
Darfurians can receive aid from sources that do require them to participate in violence, I 
predict that they will choose that option.  
 When it comes to diplomatic and military forms of intervention, I predict that 
ethnic conflict will escalate with the strength of the intervention or remain neutral. 
Diplomatic intervention can take the form of symbolic support that does not provide real 
incentives to cease violence. Moreover, selfish goals of third-party mediators may hinder 
real progress. Militias introduce an attractive incentive to living in poverty when they are 
able to give out wages, just as they are likely to introduce conflict with an increase in 
weaponry. Anything but an overpowering military intervention often increases conflict as 
external forces on one side are often met by external support on the other. In Darfur, the 
DLF and JEM enjoy the external support of South Sudan (and previously Chad, Eritrea, 
Libya, and Uganda) while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Janjaweed enjoy the 
external support of China, and Russia (and previously Iran) (Copnall 2013). The external 
parties on both sides have balanced each other out, to a certain extent, and have not been 
effective in reducing the population affected by the violence.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS SECTION 
 I utilized data collected by Dr. Olivier Degomme and Professor Debarati Guha-
Sapir for The Lancet in order to determine how many in the population of Darfur had 
been affected by the conflict (2010). Because this is a medical journal, the data covers 
deaths caused directly by violence, disease-related deaths, child mortality rates, and crude 
deaths (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 295) (Figure 1). Taking into account these other 
causes of death is important because it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the conflict that includes direct and indirect effects of violence. The data is also split into 
residents and internally displaced people, which may later allow for a deeper analysis of 
civilians afflicted by the conflict but is not within the scope of this research. 
 The data is limited to January 2003-December 2008. Analyzing a more limited 
time frame allows for a deeper analysis a small section of the conflict that may provide 
insight into other periods. Additionally, recent casualty numbers in Darfur are difficult to 
determine due to a lack of reliable data in the region. Even within this data set, the 
numbers are approximate in their totality and within the data sets are approximate for 
specific causes of death. For the purpose of this research, the following categories will be 
utilized: total number of deaths, violence-related deaths, and excess deaths. The violence-
related deaths are reported within a 95% confidence interval. The excess deaths are also 
reported within a 95% confidence interval and are broken into two categories that were 
applied based on the period-specific mortality rate: a baseline of 0.44 deaths per 10,000 
people per day (a commonly employed rate for sub-Saharan African countries) and a 
baseline of 0.3 deaths per 10,000 people per day (estimated by a World Bank report in 
2003) (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 296) (Figure 2).  
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 Based on the numbers reported by Degomme and Guha-Sapir, I then compared 
the quantitative data to the qualitative data provided by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
Project. MAR tracks “politically-active ethnic groups” and the discrimination they face in 
addition to the mobilization they orchestrate in defense of their interests (“About MAR”). 
MAR’s Qualitative Minority Group Chronologies then provides a timeline of important 
events in the history of the ethnic groups pulled from a variety of sources (“MAR Data”). 
By comparing this timeline to the data provided by Degomme and Guha-Sapir, I will 
construct a table that accounts qualitatively for the death toll in Darfur. If there are certain 
trends in the data that are unaccounted for by MAR (the data ends in December 2006), I 
will utilize a timeline provided by Al-Jazeera to provide further insight (Figure 3).  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 When comparing the numbers from Degomme and Guha-Sapir with the 
qualitative events from MAR and Al-Jazeera, an immediate correlation is not possible. 
When analyzing events that involve third-party actors, the first uptick from October to 
November of 2003 is not explained. This lapse in data in Period Two (September 2003-
March 2004) is significant in this time, as 32,995 out of 49,096 deaths were caused 
directly by violence in the region (Figure 2). However, the second uptick after January 
2004 seems to be related with the Sudanese government’s severe limitation of human 
rights agencies in their access to Darfur. This lack of humanitarian aid may have caused 
in increase in deaths, as Darfurians were not able to receive adequate food and medical 
attention. Period Three begins with a downward turn in deaths, which appears to be 
correlated with the success of Chad in mediating a ceasefire between the SLA/JEM and 
SAF, which included an agreement to end hostilities toward civilians. However, that 
decline is followed quickly by a sharp incline from June to November 2004. This spike is 
unexplained by the qualitative data.  
 From November 2004 to February 2005, there is turbulent period in the 
Degomme and Guha-Sapir data. This could be due not to an external factor, but rather the 
signing of the CPA. However, this up and down immediately precedes a period of a high 
death toll, lasting until approximately August of 2005. There is no qualitative reason 
given in the MAR or Al-Jazeera timelines that can explain this flat lining of deaths. There 
is, however, a clear decrease in the death toll from May to June 2006, when the Sudanese 
government and Minnawi branch of the SLA signed a peace pact brokered by Nigerian 
and American mediators (Figure 3). During Period Four, during which the peace pact was 
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signed, the excess deaths dropped dramatically from 70,451 in Period Three to 27,994 in 
Period Four (Figure 2). In August 2007, the UNSC authorization of 26,000 troops and 
police for Darfur’s hybrid missions and approval of the use of force to protect civilians 
seems to have an affect on the number of deaths, preventing a significant increase until 
approximately March 2008. The increase in death toll from March to October 2008 is 
again unaccounted for by the qualitative data sources. The flat line from October to 
December of 2008 could be explained by the promise al-Bashir made to cooperate with 
the UN African Missions in Darfur (UNAMID) to “secure the passage of aid convoys” in 
addition to accepting $350 million for development in Darfur (Figure 3).  
 Due to the relatively low number of humanitarian and military interventions on 
behalf of third parties in Darfur, it is impossible to give a definitive answer as to their 
effectiveness in managing ethnic conflict. The lack of access of human rights agencies’ 
access to Darfur is correlated with a rise in the death toll, while al-Bashir’s promise to 
cooperate with UNAMID is correlated with a stagnant number of deaths. The effects of 
military intervention are also ambiguous; the prolonged presence of African Union troops 
in 2006 may have had unclear results due to the normalization of their presence in Darfur. 
The troops authorized by the UNSC may have prevented an increase in the death toll, but 
did not do much to reduce the number of deaths in the region (Figures 1 and 3).  
 Because there are more examples of diplomatic aid in Darfur, the patterns are 
clearer. When third parties removed themselves from the situation in Darfur, the death 
toll often rose immediately following the action; this is true in the case of Chad 
withdrawing from Sudanese mediation, the sanctions imposed by the UNSC (which 
meant less activity in the region), and Chad’s closure of its consulate in Darfur (Figures 1 
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and 3). When third parties intervened in the situation, their actions often preceded a 
decline in the death toll; this is true in the case of Chad hosting talks in 2004 that resulted 
in a ceasefire and Nigeria and America brokering a peace pact in 2006 (Figures 1 and 3).  
 The hypothesis that humanitarian aid, but not diplomatic or military aid, would be 
the only effective form of third-party intervention can then be rejected. It is clear from the 
comparison between the total death toll in Darfur and the qualitative timeline of events 
that may be correlated with those numbers that diplomatic intervention has a positive 
effect on lowering the number of deaths in the region. While it cannot be rejected that 
humanitarian aid is effective, further research is required to find a significant correlation 
between its effects and the affected population. The same is true for military intervention. 
This could be because military intervention on behalf of one party is often met with 
intervention by another party on the opposing side. Alternatively, it could be that military 
intervention increases overall violence in the region and the militarization of Darfur has 
prevented the passage of humanitarian aid that may lower the civilian death toll. Again, 
further research is required to determine whether or not these propositions are true.  
 These results are significant in stressing the importance of diplomatic aid. While 
third parties may be wary of breaching the sovereignty of another country, it is clear 
through this research that the presence of a third party in the diplomatic sphere is 
effective in managing ethnic conflict. This finding may inform the way scholars approach 
solutions to the prolonged conflict in Darfur and influence them to support diplomatic 
efforts from other countries and bodies in order to reduce the death toll in the region.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The War in Darfur began in 2003 and has continued to present day without 
significant and lasting solutions for ending the ethnic conflict. I proposed that 
humanitarian aid would be the only effective form of third party intervention in the 
conflict, while military and diplomatic intervention would have neutral or negative 
effects. Military aid, I claimed, would result in more violence as one third-party 
intervention was met on the opposing side with another. Diplomatic intervention would 
prove to be similarly ineffective, as third parties took steps that were merely symbolic but 
had no weight behind them. However, upon the conclusion of this research, it seems to be 
that diplomatic aid has a positive effect on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while 
humanitarian and diplomatic aid produce ambiguous results.  
 These findings advance the existing literature in two significant ways. Primarily, 
these findings add to the ongoing debate on solutions to abate ethnic conflict in Darfur. 
Knowing that diplomatic aid is effective in slowing or stopping ethnic conflict may lead 
other nations to step up to aid the situation in Darfur without spending money or risking 
troops, therefore providing a relatively low-cost option to intervention. Secondly, these 
findings advance the general literature on the effectiveness of third-party interventions in 
ethnic conflict as a whole. The results of this research seemingly oppose those of Krain, 
who proposed that direct military challenge is the only effective response to genocides 
(2005). It also adds nuance to the ideas of scholars like Elbadawi and Sambanis, who 
believe that external interventions may lengthen the duration of civil war, but do not 
specific what forms of intervention do so (2000). 
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Future research may benefit from an analysis of the effects of different 
intervening bodies (i.e. individual states, NGO’s, the UN) in managing ethnic conflict. 
Moreover, research that includes a more comprehensive timeline of qualitative events 
may help to explain some of the variations in data. To further advance our knowledge, it 
would be beneficial to apply these results to the rest of the conflict (from December 2008 
to present day) to see if the same trends continued. Further research should guide the 
decisions of policymakers as they make critical decisions in alleviating one of the worst 
humanitarian crises of the 21st century.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure 1: Patterns of affected populations per 10,000 affected people between January 
2003 and December 2008. “IDP” stands for “internally displaced people.” 
 
 
 
(Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 295) 
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Figure 2: Calculated average mortality rates and number of deaths in affected 
population in Darfur by period. 
 
The periods are defined as follows: 
Period 1: February 2003 to August 2003 
Period 2: September 2003 to March 2004 
Period 3: April 2004 to December 2004 
Period 4: January 2005 to June 2006 
Period 5: July 2006 to September 2007 
Period 6: October 2007 to December 2008 
 
 
Period 
(P) 
Total 
Deaths 
Violence-
related deaths 
Excess deaths (baseline 
0.44 per 10,000 per day 
Excess deaths (baseline 
0.3 per 10,000 per day) 
P2 49,096 32,995 43,289 45,137 
P3 89,585 13,046 70,451 76,539 
P4 104,976 8,748 27,994 52,488 
P5 151,744 5,336 73,194 98,187 
P6 90,720 2,160 -4,320 25,920 
Total 486,121 62,305 210,607 298,271 
 
(Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 298) 
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Figure 3: Timeline of events regarding third-party interventions and significant events in 
the ethnic conflict in Darfur from February 2003 to December 2008. 
 
 
Date Event Type of 
Intervention  
February 
2003 
The SLA and JEM launch their first attacks against SAF in 
Darfur; SAF mobilizes Janjaweed and pays them by 
allowing them to loot the areas they clear (Stroehlein and 
Prendergast 2004)* 
N/A 
January 1 – 
February 29, 
2004 
SAF severely limits human rights agencies’ access to Darfur 
(Human Rights Watch 2005)* 
Humanitarian 
January 15, 
2004 
UNHCR opens its first refugee camp, designed to hold 
9,000-12,000* 
Humanitarian  
February 13, 
2004 
US representatives meet with tribal leaders in Darfur; the 
Fur leaders are soon arrested* 
Diplomatic  
April 8, 2004 Chad hosts talks resulting in the SLA/JEM signing a 
ceasefire agreement with the SAF and agreeing to end 
hostilities toward civilians (“Sudan”)* 
Diplomatic 
January 2005 The UN accuses the Sudanese government and militias of 
systematic abused in Darfur, but avoids the word 
“genocide”** 
Diplomatic 
January 9, 
2005 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is signed; 
SPLM is granted representation in national government* 
N/A 
February 11, 
2005 
Chad withdraws from Sudanese mediation; no longer a 
mediator between Sudanese government and three Darfur 
rebel groups* 
Diplomatic 
March 2005 UN Security Council (UNSC) authorizes sanctions against 
those who violate ceasefire in Darfur; votes to refer those 
accused of war crimes in the region to ICC** 
Diplomatic 
July 2005 The SPLM and Sudanese government install the 
Government of National Unity* 
N/A 
July 9, 2005 The Sudanese government lifts the state of emergency, 
except in Darfur* 
N/A 
October 4, 
2005 
Chad closes its consulate in Darfur* Diplomatic 
May 5, 2006 Sudanese government and Minnawi branch of SLA signs a 
peace pact brokered by Nigerian and American mediators. 
Nur SLA refuses to sign the treaty; SLA splits into Nur 
faction and the Front for the Liberation and Renaissance 
(Polgreen and Brinkley 2006)* 
Diplomatic 
June 11, 2006 The World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) notes 
Darfurians supporting the SLA* 
 
Diplomatic  
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August 2006 UN passes a resolution calling for a peacekeeping missions 
of more than 17,000 to Darfur; Sudan rejects the resolution, 
saying it would “compromise Sudanese sovereignty”*, ** 
Military  
September 
2006 
Sudan says African Union (AU) troops must leave Darfur; 
AU chooses to stay for six more months** 
Military 
May 2007 U.S. President George W. Bush imposes sanctions on Sudan 
and calls for an international arms embargo to end “genocide 
in Darfur”** 
Diplomatic 
August 2007 UNSC authorizes 26,000 troops and police for Darfur’s 
hybrid missions and approves the use of force to protect 
civilians** 
Military 
October 2007 Darfur peace talks begin in Libya; government declares 
immediate unilateral ceasefire** 
Diplomatic 
October 2008 Al-Bashir promises to cooperate with UN African Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID) to “secure the passage of aid convoys” 
in addition to $350 million on development in Darfur** 
Humanitarian 
December 
2008 
The Darfur Consortium reports that hundreds of non-Arabs 
in Darfur have been made slaves** 
Humanitarian 
 
 
*(“Chronology for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan”) 
**(“Timeline: Darfur Crisis”) 
